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Information Asymmetry, Disclosure and Foreign Institutional Investment: An 
Empirical Investigation of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2012 U.S. Department of the Treasury report shows that foreign holdings of U.S. equities 
have almost tripled over the last decade from $1.395 trillion in 2002 to $3.830 trillion in 2011. 
Nearly 80 percent of these foreign holdings are accounted by foreign institutional investors 
(FII).i What is interesting is that this remarkable rise in foreign holdings of U.S. equities took 
place despite the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 by the U.S. Congress.ii 
According to the extant literature, the enactment of SOX introduced significant compliance 
costs, which could lead U.S. firms to lower profitability and overall performance (Ahmed, 
McAnally, Rasmussen, & Weaver, 2010; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2009). Thus, a plausible 
consequence of the enactment of SOX would have been reduced interest on the part of foreign 
investors in U.S. equities. Yet the opposite happened. Why? 
 
The rising importance of foreign institutional investment in the U.S. is not only being closely 
watched by academics (Forbes, 2010) but also by the members of the U.S. Congress (Jackson, 
2010).iii Yet despite the increasing interest, our understanding of the factors influencing FII 
behavior still eludes us. The findings of the research reported here shed light on the topic by 
examining the role that firm-level disclosure and transparency plays on FII decisions. 
Acknowledging that investment preferences diverge among different types of institutional 
investors, we examine how passive investors – banks and insurance companies – in 
comparison to active investors – investment companies, independent investment advisors and 
public pension funds – react to an increase in firm-level disclosure and transparency and, 
hence a reduction in information asymmetry. This investigation is particularly relevant given 
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that the extant literature has long reported the differences in monitoring activity between 
passive and active investors (Brickley, Lease, & Smith Jr., 1988; Van Nuys, 1993; Payne, 
Millar, & Glezen, 1996; Bushee, 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 
2005; Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, & Parrino, 2006, among others), hence their 
differing exposure to the consequences of information asymmetry. 
 
Information asymmetry exists when knowledge about a firm’s returns is unequally distributed 
among its shareholders and its investors. Provoking mistrust and an overall unwillingness to 
trade (Welker, 1995), the implications of information asymmetry on investment decisions are 
well recognized (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz, 2002). 
Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding the phenomenon of information 
asymmetry and its implications. Information disclosure and transparency practices, either 
voluntary or regulative, have been consistently touted as solutions to information asymmetry 
(Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
 
The issue of disclosure and transparency is fundamental for institutional investors. Being 
continually monitored and evaluated, institutional investors are known to be rather ‘prudent’ 
in their investment decisions, ensuring not only that they are “intrinsically sound, but would 
[also] be considered by others to be…reasonable, well-informed, and prudent” (Badrinath, 
Gay, & Kale, 1989: 607). Hence corporate disclosure and transparency have become 
indispensable elements for institutional investors, positively affecting their decisions for 
investment (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). The empirical literature provides strong support 
for this premise, clearly showing institutional investors’ preference for investments exhibiting 
high visibility and low risk (Bushee & Noe, 2000; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
4 
Even more prominent are the patterns identified among FII; they not only seek the safest 
firms to invest in – for example, large firms with high turnover (Covrig, Lau, & Ng, 2006) 
and firms with low ownership concentration (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 
2003) – but also those operating in relative safe institutional environments. Indeed, Aggarwal, 
Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) revealed that U.S. mutual funds typically invest in countries 
with strong accounting standards and legal frameworks. Similarly, Gelos and Wei (2005) 
found that foreign mutual funds invest heavily on less opaque emerging markets, while Chan, 
Covrig, and Ng (2005) showed that international investors avoid countries with government 
expropriation risk.   
 
Acknowledging the importance of corporate disclosure and transparency in minimizing 
information asymmetry, we explore the impact of SOX on foreign institutional investment in 
U.S. firms since its adoption in 2002. We posit that post-SOX – with the expected increased 
amount of disclosure, and the resulting reduction in information asymmetry in U.S. firms – 
FII should find the prospect of investing in the U.S. more attractive. If this expectation is 
affirmed, then one could also argue that SOX was successful in achieving one of its objectives. 
This is important since the impact of SOX on the U.S. economy has been an open debate. 
 
In order to confirm our conjecture that information asymmetry considerations drive FII 
decisions, it is important to examine the behavior of active and passive FII separately. 
Historically, passive investors have expended minimum effort in monitoring their investee 
firms, mainly because of the costs of acquiring private information. Yet since SOX was 
enacted, one would expect that, post-SOX, such costs should be lower because of reduced 
information asymmetry. This should attract post-SOX higher foreign investment levels in 
firms that are not the traditional clientele of FII, such as firms with high private information 
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levels. We expect passive investors to primarily drive this trend since they gain the most from 
a reduction in the value of private information.  
 
The present research contributes to the literature in two distinct ways. First, we inform the 
international business scholars about the impact of corporate disclosure and transparency on 
foreign investment decisions. The role of knowledge and information accessibility has already 
been noted in the international business literature: “Increased knowledge of a foreign country 
reduces both the cost and the uncertainty of operating in a foreign market, and should increase 
the probability of an investment being made in that country” (Benito & Gripsrud, 1992, p. 
462). Surprisingly though, this body of literature has only implicitly explored the role of 
information asymmetry and of corporate disclosure, with most studies addressing solely one 
group of investors, the foreign direct investors (Li & Filer, 2007). We address this gap by 
concurrently examining the influence of corporate disclosure on foreign investment, and 
specifically on the neglected group of institutional investors.  
 
Second, we contribute to the institutional investment literature by examining the benefits 
bestowed by the implementation of a new regulatory regime, the SOX act, on foreign 
investment. Prior studies focus on the costs imposed on both domestic and foreign U.S. listed 
firms by the enactment of SOX; only a few of them place any emphasis on the benefits 
associated with this regulation. In addition, no prior study has investigated the impact of this 
regulation on foreign institutional investment preferences. We bridge this gap in the literature 
by addressing two important questions that have been rather neglected since the introduction 
of the SOX act: (a) What has been the impact of SOX on investments by FII? (b) How have 
the investment preferences of different types of FII been affected by SOX? 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we provide a brief review of the 
relevant empirical literature on the SOX legislation. We then present the conceptual 
foundations of this investigation and advance our hypotheses. Details of the database, 
variables, and methodology follow, as well as the analysis of the results and robustness tests. 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion, conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Studies on the Sox Effect 
Despite the globalization of the markets, we have not yet achieved a convergence of 
government practices and corporate disclosure policies (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Johnson, 
Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010; García-Sánchez, Rodríguez-Ariza, & Frías-Aceituno, 
2013). It appears that each time a new regulatory regime is introduced in a country its effects 
can be quite idiosyncratic, with significant implications on international investment and 
business. The post-legislation environment of the SOX act provides an intriguing research 
context as it enables us to explore the effects of reduced information asymmetry on foreign 
institutional investment in U.S. equities, a research question yet to be adequately addressed. 
 
Several strands of the extant literature examine the direct and indirect impact of the SOX act 
on U.S. firms. While one set of studies focused on the market reaction to SOX-related events 
and found conflicting results (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Jain & Rezaee, 2006; Li, 
Pincus, & Rego, 2008; Zhang, 2007), another stream addressed the impact of SOX on firm 
behavior. Results suggested that firms strive to avoid implementing SOX. For example, post-
SOX, the frequency of firms going private has increased modestly (Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 
2007); the number of firms going dark, i.e., ceasing filing with the SEC, has gone up (Leuz, 
Triantis, & Wang, 2008); and the incentives for smaller firms to remain small have increased 
(Gao, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2009).  
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Several studies examined the impact of SOX on foreign firms too, either listed or seeking a 
listing in the United States. For example, Litvak (2007) found that during the period when key 
announcements related to the implementation of SOX were being made, the stock prices of 
SOX-exposed foreign firms declined significantly. Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) examined 
the listing preferences (the choice between the U.S. exchanges and the London Stock 
Exchange) of foreign firms, post-SOX. Even though they reported no change for large firms, 
they found that the likelihood of small foreign firms listing on the NASDAQ decreased. In a 
Wall Street Journal article, Karmin and Lucchetti (2006) argued that, post-SOX, the increased 
cost of issuing shares has resulted in many, mainly non-U.S. firms de-listing from the U.S. 
and moving to alternative markets.  
 
An additional strand of the literature documented the direct costs of SOX. For example, Linck, 
et al., (2009) identified increased director and officer insurance premiums and more costly 
audit committees among the costs of SOX. Ahmed, et al., (2010) quantified the net cost of 
SOX and documented a significant drop in firms’ cash flow profitability post-SOX.  
 
While most of these studies highlight the negative effects of SOX, a few papers discussed its 
benefits. These benefits include: enhanced trust (Coates, 2007; Li, et al., 2008), increased 
transparency (Arping & Sautner, 2013), and lower information risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2009) in U.S. capital markets. 
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3. Conceptual Framework And Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and Foreign Investment 
Information asymmetry is one of the most celebrated topics in accounting, finance and 
economics. Challenging the foundations of long-established paradigms on perfect market and 
competitive equilibrium principles, the information asymmetry phenomenon has had a 
profound effect on our understanding of the market mechanisms and the associated 
implications on investment behavior (Miller & Rock, 1985; Stiglitz, 2002). It is now widely 
accepted that information asymmetries are inevitable. Hence the critical question one should 
address is not whether information irregularities exist in a market but, instead, how markets 
handle them and even more importantly how well they do so: “The most fundamental reason 
that markets with imperfect information differ from those in which information is complete is 
that, with imperfect information, market actions or choices convey information” (Stiglitz, 
2002, p. 468). Naturally, market structure became the point of attention. Corporate 
governance and disclosure mechanisms, government intervention and corruption levels, 
market liquidity, ownership concentration, and the stage of market development are some of 
the key criteria widely utilized to assess the risk profile of a market and its overall 
attractiveness to investors, especially foreign ones (Forbes, 2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001; 
Welker, 1995). 
 
Interestingly, in the international business literature, the impact of information asymmetry on 
foreign investment has only been implicitly explored. A great number of studies have focused 
on the risk and uncertainties induced by a foreign environment (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Miller, 
1992), with Miller providing a comprehensive account of the risks induced by the general 
environment, the industry and the firm. Another strand of the literature has focused on 
identifying the investment strategies, which can best manage the above mentioned risks 
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(Buckley & Casson, 1998). Yet irrespective of their invaluable insights, none of these studies 
has specifically concentrated on the information asymmetry effects and their impact on 
investment decisions. In addition, the vast majority has concentrated on decisions made by 
firms investing into foreign countries for operational purposes (FDI) and not by institutional 
investors (Li & Filer, 2007). As such our understanding of how information asymmetry 
impacts on FII decisions and the role of corporate disclosure on their investment choices 
remains still unexplored. 
 
Scholars consent that the effects of information asymmetry are particularly amplified among 
foreign investors, severely affecting their investment decisions (Brennan & Cao, 1997; Habib 
& Zurawicki, 2001; Leuz, Lins, & Warnock, 2010; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). 
Unfamiliarity with the norms and rules of the foreign market, particularly of the relationships 
formed among its actors (managers, shareholders, and the government), cultural uncertainty 
and general corruption, can hamper their evaluation of a firm’s governance structure, and as 
such their overall assessment and interpretation of the information received through it. 
Responding to this particular predicament, foreign investors tend to hold large shares of 
domestic assets in their portfolio, constantly hedging against the risks associated with a 
foreign market (Dahlquist, et al., 2003; Leuz, et al., 2010). To overcome their natural ‘home 
bias’ instincts, and invest in foreign markets, strong assurances of information disclosure and 
efficient governance mechanisms are necessary. 
 
The extant literature identifies the reasons of institutional investor sensitivity to corporate 
disclosure (Bushee & Noe, 2000). First, more disclosure reduces the price impact of trades; 
this attracts investors to invest in high disclosure stocks (Gompers & Metrick, 2001; Healey, 
et al., 1999). Second, high disclosure levels substitute for private information collection, thus 
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allowing professional investors to better identify profitable investment opportunities. Finally, 
institutional investors value higher corporate disclosure since it allows them to carry out their 
corporate governance activities, for example, monitoring managerial performance, at a lower 
cost.  
 
Naturally, FII will be especially sensitive to corporate disclosure policies and mechanisms 
that alleviate risks arising from information asymmetries. Indeed, there is ample empirical 
literature supporting this argument. Aggarwal, et al. (2005) revealed that U.S. mutual funds 
typically invest in countries with strong accounting standards and legal frameworks. Similarly, 
Gelos and Wei (2005) found that foreign mutual funds invest heavily on less opaque 
emerging markets, while Chan, et al. (2005) showed that international investors avoid 
countries with government expropriation risk. Covrig, et al. (2006), after examining the stock 
preferences of both domestic and foreign fund managers from 11 developed countries, 
revealed that although both types of investors tend to choose the ‘safest’ stocks to invest in – 
those with high return on equity, large turnover and low variability – foreign investors are 
further influenced by stock’s visibility and recognition in the global markets. These 
differential preferences are mainly attributed to the cost of information in each market and the 
cost-benefit trade-offs from investing in too many different markets. 
 
In addition, Bradshaw, Bushee, & Miller (2004) found that when U.S. investors invest in non-
U.S. firms they exhibit a preference towards firms that follow U.S. GAAP. They argued that 
the adoption of U.S. GAAP by non-U.S. firms makes it easier for U.S. investors to process the 
information included in the accounts since it is more familiar to them. The lower information 
processing costs lead to lower home bias, thus higher foreign investment levels. Thus, the 
main argument put forward was that familiarity reduces home bias which is consistent with 
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theoretical predictions (Merton, 1987; Huberman, 2001; Chan, et al., 2005).iv Furthermore, 
Covrig, Defond & Hung (2007) investigated the voluntary adoption of IAS and whether it 
enhances the ability of firms to attract foreign capital. They argued that the (additional) 
information disclosed through IAS is delivered in a familiar form to foreign investors, which 
allows them to process the information at lower cost. Finally, DeFond, Hu, Hung, & Li (2011) 
verified the argument that the cross-country uniformity on accounting standards imposed by 
the introduction of IFRS leads to greater comparability of accounting statements, therefore 
lower information processing costs and lower home bias.  
 
3.2. Information Asymmetry Reduction, SOX and Institutional Investment 
Prior literature suggests that a high level of disclosure in a company/country attracts more 
institutional investment. Several studies in the literature document the positive relationship 
between institutional investment and high levels of corporate disclosure (for example, 
Falkenstein, 1996; Healy, et al., 1999; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). The 
SOX act was implemented with a view to increase the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosure, by imposing high disclosure requirements on firms listed on U.S. exchanges 
(Hamilton & Trautmann, 2002). As Apring and Sautner (2013) argued, several sections of the 
Act require additional financial disclosures on off balance sheet transactions and pro forma 
figures (Section 401), insider trading (Section 403) and material changes in firms’ operations 
or financial condition (Section 409). Apring and Sautner (2013) found that these requirements 
lead to less opaque corporate disclosures. Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. (2009) also argued that 
SOX’s Section 404 significantly improves the effectiveness and quality of internal control 
systems, both managerial and audit. They found that these improvements result in a reduction 
in the cost of equity for the average U.S. firm. We argue that, post-SOX, an improvement in 
the information environment of U.S. firmsv should lead to lower information asymmetry, and 
 
 
 
12 
consequently the need for less effort (thus lower costs) in monitoring managerial actions. 
Such improved market conditions should attract investors from foreign countries and increase 
the level of foreign institutional investment in the U.S., post-SOX. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: Post-SOX, information asymmetry reduction will result in higher 
foreign institutional investment. 
 
3.3. SOX Effects on FII – The ‘Prudent Man’ Rule 
Next, we investigate the impact of SOX on firm-specific investment preferences of FII. 
Historically, in line with the prudent man rules, institutional investors have invested in 
‘prudent firms’, that is, firms that institutional investors find easy to defend in court.vi Prior 
studies empirically translate these to be large firms, firms with high book-to-market ratios, 
high liquidity, low leverage and high dividend yields (Badrinath, et al., 1989; Del Guercio, 
1996). Indeed, Badrinath, et al. (1989) provided supporting evidence on the effect of prudent 
man rules. They showed that the level of institutional shareholdings is positively associated 
with firm size, past performance, company beta, trading liquidity, and listing history, and 
negatively associated with stock return volatility. Del Guercio (1996) also argued that 
institutional investors tilt their portfolios towards prudent stocks (large firms, firms with high 
book-to-market ratios and high liquidity) in line with prudent man behavior.  
 
Given that SOX has resulted in a market-wide reduction in information asymmetry, it is now 
easier for investors to monitor even the smaller firms that are not necessarily under the media 
or analyst spotlight. At the same time, lower information asymmetry discourages managerial 
malpractice by making it easier to spot (Donaldson, 2005). Finally, SOX has substantially 
increased managerial accountability and litigation risk (Sen, 2007). Therefore, managers are 
expected to be more risk-averse (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2013). 
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In light of the above discussion, FII investment preferences towards specific firm 
characteristics may change post-SOX. In other words, depending on the impact of SOX on 
market-wide information asymmetry, FII may show an affinity towards less prudent stocks. In 
line with the extant literature, we classify as less prudent stocks those of smaller firms, firms 
with lower book-to-market ratios, lower liquidity, and higher leverage, as well as firms with 
lower dividend yields. We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 2: As information asymmetry is reduced post-SOX, foreign 
institutional investment in less prudent stocks should rise. 
 
3.4. SOX Effects on FII – Passive versus Active Investors 
Our final pair of hypotheses relates to the investment preferences of different types of FII. 
Post-SOX, enhanced disclosure should lead to a drop in the value of private information in the 
U.S. markets. We argue that this reduction in the value of private information will influence 
FII behavior in the United States. In line with Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2010)vii, we 
categorize FII into active and passive investors and examine the post-SOX investment 
behavior of these investors in all firms, as well as in firms where the level of private 
information is expected to be high (high research and development (R&D) expenditure firms). 
The above categorization/classification is prevalent in the extant literature (e.g., Brickley, et 
al., 1988; Van Nuys, 1993; Payne, et al., 1996; Bushee, 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2003; 
Almazan, et al., 2005; Borokhovich, et al., 2006). Other names also used in the literature for 
the active vs. passive classification are “pressure-insensitive” vs. “pressure-sensitive” 
institutional investors. However, the underlying argument and the different types of investors 
that appear under each classification remain always the same.  
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According to Brickley, et al. (1988), in order to protect existing or potential business 
relationships, passive institutional investors (such as banks and insurance companies) tend not 
to put pressure on the managers of their investee firms. Since they do not want to damage 
their relationship with the company management, that is, face high costs of monitoring, 
passive institutional investors are not expected to expend effort in collecting private 
information (Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007). As a result, a potential reduction in the value of 
private information favors them greatly. On the other hand, active institutional investors (such 
as investment companies, independent investment advisors and public pension funds) do not 
actively seek business ties with the firms they invest in (Brickley, et al., 1988) and encounter 
lower legal restrictions on their investments. Thus, they are more likely to collect and use 
private information (Almazan, et al., 2005). A potential reduction in the value of private 
information could therefore signal a loss of competitive advantage for active institutional 
investors.  
 
The additional information transparency in the U.S. markets, brought about by SOX, is 
expected to result in a reduction in the value of private information. As a result, we expect, 
post-SOX, passive foreign institutional investment in the U.S. to increase more than active 
foreign institutional investment. In addition, we expect this increase to be more pronounced in 
firms with higher levels of private information, for example, high R&D expenditure firms. 
Thus: 
Hypotheses 3: Post-SOX, reduced information asymmetry, will result in an 
increase in investment by passive FII greater than that by active FII.  
Hypotheses 4: Post-SOX, investment by passive FII in firms with higher levels of 
private information will be greater than that by active FII.  
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4. Research Design 
4.1. Sample and Data Sources 
We employ the universe of the Thomson Reuters 13F database for the holdings of FII in U.S. 
firms over the period 1999 to 2012.viii We include all constituent firms of the following 
indices: S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600.ix In total, we gather information 
on the holdings of institutional investors from 18 different foreign countries.  
 
Compustat, the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), IBES and CRSP provide the 
relevant firm-level data at fiscal year-end. The 13F filings report institutional investor 
holdings on a quarterly basis. We use the institutional holdings reported for the last quarter of 
each fiscal year and merge these with the other accounting and market data. After excluding 
firm-years with missing values for some of the accounting data, in particular firm-level 
governance information, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 15,887 firm-years for 2,752 
unique firms. 
 
4.2. Empirical Models 
To test our hypotheses we estimate the following regressions:  
 
tftfztf YDXaSOXaaFIO ,,10, e++++=     (1) 
 
tftfvtfztf YDXSOXXSOXFIO ,,,10, * edddd +++++=   (2) 
 
tftfztftftf YDXDRSOXDRSOXPASSCONS ,,,3,210, &*& ebbbbb ++++++=   (3) 
 
The dependent variable (FIO) is the same in models 1 and 2. FIOf,t is the total percentage 
ownership of a firm’s equity by FII in firm f at time t. It is defined as the ratio of the shares 
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held by the FII in the firm to the firm’s shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. In separate tests 
we also use ACTIVEFIO (PASSIVEFIO), which is the ratio of the shares held by active 
(passive) FII in the firm to the firm’s shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. PASSCONS is the 
concentration level of passive foreign institutional investment. It is equal to total foreign 
passive institutional ownership divided by total foreign institutional ownership in firm f at 
time t. We separate institutional investors into active vs. passive institutional investors in line 
with Bushee, et al. (2010). We classify independent investment advisors, investment 
companies and public pension funds as active institutional investors. We classify banks, 
insurance companies, university and foundation endowments, corporate pension funds and 
miscellaneous investors as passive institutional investors. SOX is a dummy which is equal to 
one for firm-years after 2002 and zero otherwise.  
 
In each model, we use the following vector of firm-level control variables (X): firm size, 
dividend yield, book-to-market ratio, turnover ratio, leverage, return on equity, cash level, 
DINDEX, stock return, analyst following and audit quality. XSOX * is a vector of 
interaction terms, created by interacting each control variable with the SOX dummy. R&D is a 
proxy of the level of private information in firm f at time t. R&D*SOX is the interaction 
between R&D and the SOX dummy. YD are year dummies. 
 
Model 1 allows us to test our first hypothesis that, post-SOX, we expect higher foreign 
institutional investment due to the SOX-led reduction in information asymmetry (H1). For our 
argument to be verified, we anticipate the SOX coefficient (α1) to be positive and statistically 
significant. Similarly, with model 2, we test our second contention that, post-SOX, foreign 
investment will be higher in less prudent stocks (H2). We expect various coefficients of the 
interaction terms (δν) that capture the marginal SOX effect on foreign investor preferences 
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regarding firm characteristics to be significant and with a sign confirming the notion that FII 
invest more in less prudent stocks, post-SOX. Model 3 test our third and fourth hypotheses 
that, post-SOX, investment by passive FII will increase more than the investment by active 
FII (H3), as well as that passive FII will invest more in firms with higher levels of disclosure 
compared to active FII (H4). For these arguments to stand, we would expect the coefficients 
β1 and β2 to be positive and statistically significant. 
 
We closely follow the extant literature in identifying and defining our control variables. In 
particular:  
Firm Size (SIZE) is the market value of equity at fiscal year-end (Compustat item MKVALT). 
The institutional ownership literature mostly finds a positive relationship between firm size 
and institutional ownership (for example, Badrinath, et al., 1989; Bennett, Sias, & Starks, 
2003; Cready, 1994; Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Falkenstein, 1996). Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) explained this based on institutional investors’ preference for investing in 
well-known firms and firms with which they are familiar.  
Dividend Yield (DY) is the dividend per share (Compustat item DVPSX-F) divided by the 
fiscal year-end share price (Compustat item PRCC-F). According to Del Guercio (1996), 
institutional investors should invest in high dividend yield stocks, in line with prudent man 
rules. 
Book-to-Market Ratio (BM) is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of 
common equity outstanding (Compustat item CEQ) to the market value of equity. High (low) 
values represent value (growth) firms. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) found that institutional investors prefer growth firms. In 
contrast, Ferreira and Matos (2008) showed that U.S. (foreign) institutional investors invest 
more in value (growth) stocks.  
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Firm Market Turnover (TURN) is our measure of stock market liquidity (Dahlquist and 
Robertsson, 2001). We first calculate the monthly turnover of a stock. Monthly stock 
turnover is defined as the monthly volume of a stock (CRSP item VOL), divided by the 
firm’s shares outstanding at the end of that month (CRSP item SHROUT). An annual figure 
is obtained by taking the average of the twelve monthly observations. Institutional investors 
prefer liquid stocks as they reduce their trading costs and also represent firms with greater 
information flows, hence less information asymmetry. In these firms, institutional investors 
can better identify and replace poor managers (Almazan, et al., 2005). Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) reported a positive relation between institutional ownership and market liquidity. 
Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) 
plus long-term total debt (Compustat item DLTT), to total assets (Compustat item AT). 
Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) examined the role of institutional ownership on managerial 
ownership and debt policy, and found a negative relationship between institutional 
investment and debt levels. In addition, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) used leverage as a 
proxy for a firm’s long-term financial distress and found a negative relationship between it 
and foreign investment.  
Return on Equity (ROE) is a measure of firm profitability. It is the ratio of net income 
(Compustat item NI) to common equity (Compustat item CEQ). Aggarwal, et al. (2005) 
found a positive relationship between return on equity and institutional investment. 
Cash Holdings (CASH) are measured as the ratio of cash and short-term investments 
(Compustat item CHE) to total assets (Compustat item AT). Since firms with more cash are 
typically classified as having greater financial strength, we expect institutional investors to 
prefer to invest in these firms (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). 
Directors’ Index (DINDEX) is our measure of a firm’s governance quality. We follow Bushee, 
et al. (2010) to create DINDEX. It includes five different dummy variables: CEO-chairman 
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duality, the presence of board interlocks, attendance of board meetings, board size and the 
percentage of independent directors. Bushee, et al. (2010) classify firms where the CEO is 
also the Chairman of the board as having lower governance quality. Our CEO dummy 
variable takes the value one if the two positions are combined and zero otherwise. We define 
as interlocked directors those directors who serve on each other’s boards, and their presence 
on a board is considered an indicator of weaker governance. This is because these directors 
might have incentives to vote in ways that benefit their counterparts and themselves (Bushee, 
et al., 2010). We create a variable (DLOCK), which is equal to one if there are any 
interlocks on the board of directors and zero otherwise. Less attendance of board meetings is 
associated with less successful monitoring of the management team. Therefore, a low level 
of attendance is an indication of weaker governance. We create a dummy variable (DBAD), 
taking the value one if any of the directors misses 75% or more of the board meetings and 
zero otherwise. The proxy for board size is the logarithm of the number of directors 
(LNDIR). If the board size is large, Bushee, et al. (2010) expect there to be greater problems 
with communication, coordination and decision making. Next, fewer independent directors 
on the board indicate weaker corporate governance of the firm. Since independent directors’ 
careers do not depend heavily on the management team, they are considered to be more 
effective monitors of a firm’s managers. We calculate the percentage of directors that are 
dependent (PNID). We split the distribution of LNDIR and PNID into high and low groups 
using k-means cluster analysis. We create dummies for these two variables which are equal 
to one if they are in the high group and zero otherwise. We end up with five dummy 
variables; DINDEX is the sum of these five dummy variables. A value of zero (five) 
indicates boards with the strongest (weakest) governance structures. Bushee, et al. (2010) 
found a negative relation between institutional ownership and DINDEX. 
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Stock Return (RETURN) is a measure of annual stock returns. We annualize the average daily 
return (CRSP item: RET) over a year using the number of trading days in that year. Ferreira 
and Matos (2008) reported a positive relationship between foreign institutional investment 
and stock returns.  
Analyst Following (ANALYST) is the number of analysts covering a firm in a given year. We 
create this variable by calculating the total number of unique analyst codes (IBES item: 
ANALYS) for a given firm each year. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) found a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and analyst following.  
Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable. It is equal to one if the firm’s auditor in a given 
year is one of the Big-5 auditing firms (Compustat item: AU), that is, Arthur Andersen, 
Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, zero otherwise. Kane and 
Velury (2004) found that institutional investors prefer firms with high audit quality. 
Research and Development (R&D) is our proxy for the level of private information in a firm. 
Following the extant literature (for example, Aboody & Lev, 2000), we define it as the ratio 
of R&D expenditure (Compustat item XRD) to the book value of assets (Compustat item 
AT). Institutional investors avoid investing in high private information firms (Graves & 
Waddock, 1990; Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992). 
 
We use firm fixed effect panel regressions to test each model.x This allows us to account for 
time-invariant firm-level omitted variables that could bias our results; these firm fixed effects 
control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm characteristics that could affect the investment 
decision of foreign investors, for example, geographic location, distance from financial 
centers, corporate culture, exposure to foreign corporate cultures, and so on.xi We also use 
year dummies in all our regressions in order to control for cross-sectional dependence 
(Gujarati, 2004). The year dummies also help us to remove deterministic time trends from our 
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analyses (see the robustness section for more details). Finally, in all regressions we use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors; we cluster them at the firm level to control for time-
series dependence. This is particularly important in our setting since ownership variables 
typically have high autocorrelation. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, shows the time series of institutional investment by foreign (FI), active 
foreign (Active) and passive foreign (Passive) institutional investors in the U.S. between the 
years 1999 and 2012.xii It also reports the percentage of passive to total foreign investment 
(PC). Panel A illustrates that FI increases significantly between 1999 and 2008. The level of 
foreign institutional ownership in U.S. firms has doubled (8.42% compared to 4.01%). This is 
mainly driven by passive foreign investors, who increase their holdings 245% during this 
period. There is a drop in FI after the onset of the recent financial crisis (2009-2012). This is 
consistent with recent evidence that home bias increases during global crises since there is 
retrenchment of gross capital outflows by foreign investors (Forbes & Warnock, 2012). 
However, FI during that period is still economically and statistically larger compared to the 
pre-SOX period. For example, in 2012 FI is 52% larger compared to the average FI during 
the pre-SOX period (6.56 vs. 4.32). Interestingly, the drop in FI is mainly driven by active FII 
as illustrated by the increase in PC during 2010-2012. In this study, we argue that the 
enactment of SOX is one of the reasons behind the increase in FI and Passive post-SOX; we 
test this line of argument in the following sections.  
---------------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------------- 
Table 1, Panel B, presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables used in this 
study. We winsorize size, dividend yield, leverage, return on equity and stock return at the 1% 
level (two tails), since the original distributions of these variables are skewed. The average 
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firm in the sample has more than 5% foreign ownership, 80% of which comes from passive 
FII. It has a market value of $7.5 billion and a dividend yield of 1%; both its leverage and 
turnover stand at 21%. Return on equity is 10%, stock return is 7%, the book-to-market ratio 
is 0.14, DINDEX is 1.7 and the ratio of cash holdings to total assets is 14%. R&D expenditure 
accounts for 3% of the book value of assets. Also, the average firm is followed by 13 analysts; 
93% of the firms in our sample employ a Big-5 auditor.  
 
At a univariate level, FIO is positively and significantly correlated to SOX. The magnitude of 
the Pearson coefficient is the largest compared to all other coefficients for FIO (untabulated 
result).This result provides initial evidence on the importance of the enactment of SOX as a 
determinant of foreign institutional investment in U.S. firms.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. SOX Effect on FIO 
We begin our multivariate analysis by examining whether the enactment of SOX has had an 
effect on the level of foreign institutional investment in U.S. firms. Table 2 presents the 
results of firm fixed effect panel regressions where the dependent variable is FIO. Foreign 
institutional investment is positively associated with SOX. This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis 1 suggesting that the SOX-led reduction in information asymmetry is positively 
influencing FII decisions. Furthermore, the magnitude of the SOX coefficient is indicative of 
a large SOX effect. Almost 5% FIO is associated with the enactment of SOX. Still, caution 
should be exercised in interpreting this coefficient since it is possible that (omitted) 
characteristics, not controlled by our firm and year variables, inflate the magnitude of the 
SOX effect. The difference-in-differences analysis in the robustness section addresses this 
issue.  
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---------------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------------- 
To further support our inferences, we investigate separately the investment preferences of 
active and passive institutional investors, shown in columns 2 and 3, respectively. We expect 
that passive institutional investors drive the FIO-SOX relation. This is because passive 
institutional investors are bound to benefit the most from a reduction in the value of private 
information; hence we expect the SOX effect to be more pronounced for them. We find 
positive, significant SOX coefficients in both regressions, that is, both types of institutional 
investors increase their stakes in U.S. firms, post-SOX. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficients reveals that the increase in overall foreign investment levels is mainly driven by 
passive investors, i.e., the coefficient for passive FII is 4.65 compared to 0.19 for the active 
ones. We return to this issue later in this section. 
 
The signs of the coefficients of the control variables included in the analysis are in line with 
those reported in prior studies. In Table 2, column 1, we report that FII prefer to invest in 
value firms with high turnover ratios, high past performance, high cash holdings, better 
governancexiii and high analyst following. These preferences are mainly driven by the passive 
FII. In contrast, the active FII are primarily attracted by dividend yields.  
 
5.2. SOX Effects on FII – The ‘Prudent Man’ Rule 
Table 3 reports the results of our regression analysis relating to Hypothesis 2. In this table, we 
report the effect of SOX on the firm-level investment preferences of FII. Our aim is to report 
the changes in their preferences that occur as a result of the enhanced corporate transparency 
and reliability, post-SOX. We interact the SOX dummy with each of the firm-specific 
characteristics, separately. We use all of the interaction terms in our regressions to find the 
SOX marginal effect on foreign institutional investment for each firm-specific characteristic.  
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In column 1, the dependent variable is FIO. Post-SOX, FII increase their holdings in smaller 
firms (-0.01) and those with higher leverage levels (1.01). The coefficients for the respective 
SOX marginal effects are both significant. We also observe (in column 3) that passive FII 
increase their holdings in firms paying lower dividends (-5.36) and note that they are also 
behind the firm size marginal effect reported in column 1, as illustrated by both the magnitude 
and significance of the coefficient. Overall, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Indeed, FII appear to increase their investment levels, post-SOX, in firms that are not their 
traditional turf, that is, smaller, riskier firms. Investment in these firms is not in line with 
prudent man rule expectations (Del Guercio, 1996). The signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients in column 3 clearly indicate that passive FII primarily drive this change in 
investment behavior. This finding further supports our inference that this change in 
investment behavior is due to a reduction in information asymmetry and the resulting negative 
impact of SOX on the value of private information. We provide additional results relating to 
this in the next section. 
---------------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------------- 
We note that FIO increases in better governed (-0.24) and analyst-followed (0.03) firms, as 
well as firms that are more liquid (2.18), post-SOX. This is not surprising, given that the 
enactment of SOX has led to a market-wide improvement in corporate governance quality. 
The SOX-initiated reduction in information asymmetry has also led to an improvement in 
stock market liquidity across the board (Jain, Kim, & Rezaee, 2008). Finally, we observe that 
there is no marginal SOX effect on overall FIO for certain performance measures, such as 
book-to-market and return on equity ratios, as well as cash holdings. 
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5.3. Passive FIO and SOX 
In this section, consistent with our hypotheses, we focus our discussion on the impact of the 
SOX enactment on passive FIO relative to active FIO. So far, our results indicate that passive 
FII have benefited the most from the enactment of SOX. This is illustrated by the significantly 
greater increase in their post-SOX holdings of U.S. equity than that for active FII. Given that 
passive investors do not monitor the management teams of the firms in which they invest, 
they stand to gain the most from a reduction in the value of private information through better 
disclosure and internal monitoring. We therefore expect post-SOX passive FIO to increase 
(relative to active FIO) in firms where the level of private information is traditionally higher, 
that is, high information asymmetry firms.  
 
Table 4 reports further results relating to these predictions. The dependent variable is the 
foreign passive institutional investment concentration (PASSCONS). It captures the 
investments of passive institutional investors relative to active institutional investors. In 
addition, we opt to use an accounting-based proxy for firm-level private information, which is 
commonly used in the extant literature, that is, the R&D expenditure scaled by the book value 
of assets.xiv Market-based proxies, for example measures of stock market liquidity, are not 
appropriate since there is a direct SOX effect on them (Jain, et al., 2008).  
---------------- Insert Table 4 about here ---------------- 
Table 4, column 1, reports a highly significant positive coefficient of SOX (0.09), which 
confirms that passive FII invest more, post-SOX, in U.S. firms, relative to active institutional 
investors (our Hypothesis 3). In line with our predictions in Hypothesis 4, we also find a 
positive significant marginal SOX effect of 0.37 on the relation between firm-level private 
information and passive ownership concentration (column 2). Post-SOX, passive FII increase 
their holdings in high private information firms, more than active investors.  
 
 
 
26 
 
To further strengthen our inferences, in column 3 we run an alternative specification. Instead 
of using the R&D level in a firm, we split our sample into above/below the sample median 
R&D in year 2001, i.e., one year prior to the event. We then create a dummy variable (RD) 
taking the value one for above-median R&D levels and zero otherwise. This allows us to 
broadly classify our cross-section into high vs. low private information firms. By using the 
2001 sample median we also avoid capturing any influence of the SOX enactment on R&D 
levels. The interaction of this variable with SOX is positive and significant (0.04), confirming 
our inferences. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1. Are We Simply Reporting A Time Trend or Other Confounding Effects? 
A common shortcoming in studies that investigate structural breaks in an economy is that it is 
difficult to exclude alternative explanations based on confounding effects. A frequent 
criticism is that the reported relations are manifestations of time trends in the data or 
contemporaneous effects unrelated to the hypothesized (regulatory) effect. As a first attempt 
to alleviate concerns that such time trends and/or omitted variables might drive our findings, 
we include year dummies and firm fixed effects in all our prior analyses. Time dummies 
should capture deterministic (as opposed to stochastic) time trends. Firm fixed effects control 
for unobserved firm characteristics. In this section, we use more robust methods to deal with 
this issue. 
 
The implementation of SOX was compulsory, with immediate effect, for all U.S. listed firms, 
apart from some small firms which were allowed more time to comply with the act, as 
regulators concluded that these firms would not be able to cope with the increased compliance 
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costs imposed by SOX.xv The exempted firms, called non-accelerated filers, were firms with a 
market value of equity lower than $75 million. We expect to see no change in the investment 
preferences of FII for these firms. As a result, they form an ideal control group.  
 
The existence of non-accelerated filers in the U.S. market allows us to run a difference-in-
differences (DD) estimation. This estimation helps us avoid the problem of time trends 
biasing our inferences, since we compare the two groups (non-accelerated vs. accelerated 
filers) over the same time period. It also allows us to carry out a time-series comparison 
(before and after the SOX enactment) between the two groups, thereby alleviating concerns 
regarding the impact of unobserved, omitted variables in the analysis.  
 
In order to establish our treatment group, we create a new dummy variable (ACCE), which 
takes the value one if a firm is classified as an accelerated filer, and zero if it is a non-
accelerated filer. We interact this with the SOX dummy (SOX). All model specifications also 
include the uninteracted variables and the control variables used in our prior analyses. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the DD regressions for total FIO, as well as for passive and 
active FIO.xvi There is a positive significant effect of SOX on FIO for accelerated filers. The 
effect is driven by the passive FII (0.94), consistent with our prior results.xvii One would have 
expected to find insignificant coefficients, if our prior results were simply a manifestation of a 
time trend in FIO or some other confounding effect. The fact that we find significant results in 
the DD analysis supports our conclusions regarding the positive effect of SOX on FIO. The 
direct SOX effect is economically significant. The enactment of SOX is associated with an 
increase of 0.54% in FII equity holdings. This is 27% (12%) the average (maximum) increase 
in FIO between the pre- and post-SOX periods, that is, 2% (4.47%). The economic 
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significance of the SOX effect on passive FIO is much more pronounced (i.e., 47% and 21%, 
respectively) consistent with our predictions. 
---------------- Insert Table 5 about here ---------------- 
6.2. Propensity Score Matching Tests 
A key assumption in the DD analysis is that, in the absence of the treatment, in this case the 
implementation of SOX, there would have been no difference in the average change in the 
dependent variable, that is, FIO, between the treatment and control groups. This is the so-
called parallel trends assumption (Roberts & Whited, 2013). By definition, the non-
accelerated filers are smaller firms than the rest of the cross-section. This raises concerns over 
whether the parallel trends assumption holds in our setting. In order to deal with this potential 
limitation of our DD tests, we run a series of propensity score matching (PSM) tests. PSM 
procedures (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) help identify control firms that exhibit minimal 
observable differences in characteristics relative to treatment firms. Thus, for each pair of 
matched firms in our tests the only key difference is whether they comply with SOX or not. 
Therefore, using the matched firms we can isolate the impact of SOX on foreign investment 
and at the same time satisfy the parallel trends assumption. To implement PSM, we first 
calculate the probability (propensity score) that a firm with certain characteristics will have to 
comply with SOX. We run probit regressions where the propensity score is a function of the 
firm variables we also use in the DD models. Then, we run different matching algorithms (i.e., 
Radius, Nearest Neighbor(s) and Kernel) to create pairs of matched firms; this ensures the 
robustness of our results. In Table 6, we report the average treatment/SOX effect on the 
treated (ATT), separately for FIO, ACTIVEFIO and PASSIVEFIO (Panels A-C). The results 
are not only consistent with the DD ones (Table 5) but also stronger in terms of both 
economic and statistical significance, which further strengthens our inferences. 
---------------- Insert Table 6 about here ---------------- 
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6.3. Falsification Tests 
In order to provide additional evidence of the causal effect of SOX on foreign investment in 
U.S. firms, we also run falsification (pseudo-event) tests. These tests allow us to reject the 
argument that our findings are driven by spurious relations. Using Monte Carlo Permutations, 
we randomly shuffle the treatment variable used in the DD models (ACCE*SOX) 10,000 
times across all firms. If our results are driven by unobservable firm-specific characteristics, 
then we should still find a significant association between this placebo treatment variable and 
foreign investment. However, if SOX has an effect on foreign investment, then the random 
reshuffling of the treatment variable should discard any possible association between this 
placebo variable and FIO. In order to formally test this, we compare the coefficients of this 
placebo variable to the ACCE*SOX coefficients we get in the DD tests (Table 5). If the 
coefficients from the placebo variable are higher than the ACCE*SOX coefficient, then we 
would not be able to reject the null hypothesis that there is no link between treatment 
(ACCE*SOX) and outcome (FIO). We report the results of this analysis in Table 7. We do not 
observe a single instance (out of 10,000 trials) where the placebo coefficient is higher than the 
true coefficient. This corresponds to an implied p-value of 0.000; thus we reject the null 
hypothesis. This result remains when we test the SOX effect on ACTIVEFIO and 
PASSIVEFIO. Taken together, these falsification tests indicate that the SOX-FIO association 
is not spurious. 
---------------- Insert Table 7 about here ---------------- 
 
6.4. Macro Effects 
Foreign institutional investment is affected by global macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, 
the observed increase in FIO for U.S. firms, post-SOX, could be due to better prospects for 
the U.S. economy, or an increase in the global wealth available for investment in the equity 
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markets. A recent CRS report (Jackson, 2010) discusses the ‘safe haven’ effect during times 
of uncertainty, favorable returns on investments relative to risk, a surplus of savings in 
countries around the world, the well-developed U.S. financial system, and the overall stability 
of the U.S. economy, as reasons for the foreign capital inflows into the U.S. In principle, the 
analyses we ran in the previous paragraphs should address the possible impact of omitted 
variables on the FIO-SOX relationship. In addition, the use of year dummies in all of our 
models should capture the effect of cross-sectional dependence, that is, market-wide effects 
that could influence FIO. However, we run a further model specification, where instead of the 
year dummies we add two variables, which capture macroeconomic conditions; one that 
proxies for the implied risk in the U.S. economy (the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index; VIX) and another that captures the global economic growth (the weighted 
average GDP growth for all of the countries represented in our dataset; WVGDP). Even under 
this specification, the SOX coefficient remains positive and highly significant (untabulated 
result).  
 
6.5. Further Tests 
The extant literature on institutional investment has provided evidence of reverse causality 
between institutional ownership levels and specific firm characteristics, for example firm size 
and profitability. Therefore, some of the base (not marginal) effects we report in our tables 
could be interpreted based on reverse causality inferences. Regarding this issue, we would 
like to point out that the level of foreign institutional ownership is small compared to that of 
domestic institutions. At its peak, the average foreign ownership is 8%, compared to more 
than 60% for domestic institutions. Therefore, the impact of FII on firm characteristics should 
be minimal. In addition, in order to alleviate reverse causality concerns, we exclude from our 
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sample any foreign investors with more than 10% equity holdings in a specific firm, and re-
run our analyses (untabulated result). The results remain unchanged.  
 
We also test two model specification choices we have made in this paper, namely the 
clustering of standard errors at the firm level and the use of firm fixed effects. In all our 
regressions, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level to account for time-series 
dependence. We re-estimate the model in equation 1, but now cluster the standard errors at the 
industry level, using the two-digit SIC classifications. The SOX coefficient remains positive 
and significant (untabulated result). We also re-run the analyses for the other three hypotheses. 
The results remain unchanged (untabulated result). Furthermore, we test the accuracy of the 
fixed effect specification. Firstly, we run the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
test to identify the existence of random effects. We reject the null hypothesis that the variance 
of the random firm effects equals zero. Thus, the random effect model is preferred to OLS. 
Secondly, we run a Hausman (1978) test and strongly reject the null hypothesis, which 
indicates that the fixed effect specification will give the most unbiased coefficients. We 
conclude that the firm fixed effect specification gives the most robust results.  
 
Finally, we run a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) analysis for our basic model to check 
whether our results are driven by multicollinearity. We find no indication of a bias.  
 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
SOX was enacted to reinforce confidence in the U.S. markets after a number of high profile 
corporate scandals in the early part of this century. What has been the effect of the SOX Act 
on foreign institutional investment in U.S. firms? Has SOX had an impact on the investment 
preferences of FII? The passage of SOX has led to an increased level of disclosure by U.S. 
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firms; yet, little has been reported so far about the effects of such endeavor on foreign 
investment in U.S. firms, especially by institutional investors.  
 
Using information on the holdings of institutional investors from 18 foreign countries, we find 
that the change in the information environment of U.S. firms has indeed positively impacted 
on foreign institutional investment levels. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we observe 
that FIO has increased subsequent to the enactment of SOX. We argue that this positive 
relationship is, ceteris paribus, a result of the enhanced corporate disclosure and the ensuing 
reduction in information asymmetry. Foreign investors are particularly sensitive to 
information asymmetries aggravated by governance problems and/or expropriation by 
insiders (Leuz, et al., 2010). However, the better internal accountability and monitoring 
control mechanisms induced by SOX in U.S. firms reduce information asymmetries and 
lessen investors’ evaluation (agency) costs, perceived risks and biases. The overall level of 
trust in U.S. firms is elevated, and the prospect of investing in them becomes more attractive 
(Forbes, 2010; Healy, et al., 1999). This result affirms the initial expectations from the SOX 
enactment; the implementation of the act has been successful in achieving one of its 
objectives – reduction in information asymmetry. It further strongly denotes the critical role 
of corporate disclosure policies in FII investment. 
 
Interestingly, we not only find an increase in foreign institutional investment, post-SOX, but 
also changes in FII investment preferences. We document two intriguing results. First, post-
SOX, FII exhibit a shift in their investment behavior towards less prudent stocks. Contrary to 
the ‘prudent man’ rule according to which we would anticipate institutional investors 
investing in the most reliable firms – large firms with high turnover, high liquidity and 
typically global exposure (Badrinath, et al., 1989; Del Guercio, 1996) – we find that post-
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SOX, FII have increased their investment in smaller firms, firms with lower dividend yields, 
and firms with higher leverage. We therefore conclude that the investment shortcomings 
foreign investors typically associate with riskier firms can be subdued with increased 
information disclosure induced by the enactment of SOX.  
 
Second, in line with Hypotheses 3 and 4, we discover that the increase in passive FIO has 
been larger than that of active FIO, post-SOX. We argue that this is driven by a reduction in 
the value of private information, post-SOX. Passive investors incur high costs of monitoring 
their investments; hence they rationally abstain from monitoring (Brickley, et al., 1988). As a 
result they do not collect private information. On the contrary, active investors’ competitive 
advantage lies on their efficiency in collecting private information (Almazan, et al., 2005). 
Better disclosure results in a reduction in the value of private information. Hence SOX 
provides high gains for passive investors and potentially a loss of competitive advantage for 
the active ones. Our results strongly support this line of reasoning; we uncover that not only 
passive foreign investment has increased more than active foreign investment post-SOX, but 
also that this trend is pronounced in stocks with high levels of private information.  
 
Overall, our study makes a unique contribution in two distinct ways. First, we provide a 
theoretical explanation (information symmetry framework) as well as empirical evidence on 
the SOX consequences so far and their implications. Second, from a policy perspective, we 
directly respond to the question of whether SOX has been effective and in what extent, and 
offer judgments in terms of investor benefits and market mechanism. The results particularly 
highlight a positive effect of the enactment of SOX, namely higher foreign institutional 
investment in U.S. firms. Further, firms that were traditionally overlooked by foreign 
institutional investors are now attracting their attention, resulting in a more evenly distribution 
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of investment among small and large firms. Future research should investigate the potential 
implications of this trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
References 
Aboody, D., & Lev, B. (2000). Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766. 
Aggarwal, R., Klapper, L., & Wysocki, P. D. (2005). Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional 
Investors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(12), 2919-2946. 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28, 447–65. 
Ahmed, A., S., McAnally, M. L., Rasmussen, S., & Weaver, C. D. (2010). How Costly is the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act? Evidence on the Effects of the Act on Corporate Profitability? Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 16(3), 352-369. 
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2005). Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of 
Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation. Financial Management, 34(4), 5-34. 
Arping, S., & Sautner, Z. (2013). Did SOX Section 404 Make Firms Less Opaque? Evidence from 
Cross-Listed Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(3), 1133-1165. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., Kinney, W. R., & LaFond, R. (2009). The Effect of SOX 
Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity. Journal of Accounting Research, 
47(1), 1-43. 
Badrinath, S. G., Gay, G. D., & Kale, J. R. (1989). Patterns of Institutional Investment, Prudence, and 
the Managerial 'Safety-Net' Hypothesis. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 56(4), 605-629. 
Bathala, C. T., Moon, K. P., & Rao, R. P. (1994). Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact 
of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective. Financial Management, 23(3), 38-50. 
Benito, G. R. G., & Gripsrud, G. (1992). The Expansion of Foreign Direct Investments: Discrete 
Rational Location Choices or a Cultural Learning Process? Journal of International Business 
Studies, 23(3), 461-476. 
Bennett, J. A., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic 
Institutional Preferences. Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), 1203-1238. 
Borokhovich, K., Brunarski, K., Harman, Y., & Parrino, R. (2006). Variation in the Monitoring 
Incentives of Outside Stockholders. Journal of Law & Economics, 49(2), 651-680.  
Bradshaw, M. T., Bushee, B. J., & Miller, G. S. (2004). Accounting Choice, Home Bias, and U.S. 
Investment in Non-U.S. Firms. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(5), 795-841. 
 
 
 
36 
Brennan, M. J., & Cao, H. H. (1997). International Portfolio Investment Flows. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(5), 1851-1880. 
Breusch, T., & Pagan, A., Rodney. (1980). The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to 
Model Specification in Econometrics. Review of Economic Studies, 47(1), 239-253. 
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith Jr., C. W. (1988). Ownership Structure and Voting on 
Antitakeover Amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(0), 267-291. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1998). Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: Extending the 
internalization approach. Journal of international business studies, 539-561. 
Bushee, B. J. (1998). The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behaviour. 
The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305-33. 
Bushee, B. J., Carter, M. E., & Gerakos, J. (2010). Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms. In  Working paper. Pennsylvania: The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Bushee, B. J., & Noe, C. F. (2000). Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and Stock 
Return Volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 38(3), 171-202. 
Chan, K., Covrig, V., & Ng, L. (2005). What Determines the Domestic Bias and Foreign Bias? 
Evidence from Mutual Fund Equity Allocations Worldwide. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 
1495-1534. 
Chen, X., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2007). Monitoring: Which institutions matter? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 86(2), 279-305. 
Chhaochharia, V., & Grinstein, Y. (2007). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 
2002 Governance Rules. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1789-1825. 
Coates, J. C. (2007). The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 21(1), 91-116. 
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., & Lys, T. Z. (2013). Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: 
Implications for Investments and Risk Taking. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(4), 
1296-1332. 
Core, J. E. (2001). A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 441-456. 
 
 
 
37 
Covrig, V., Lau, S. T., & Ng, L. (2006). Do domestic and foreign fund managers have similar 
preferences for stock characteristics? A cross-country analysis. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 37(3), 407-429. 
Covrig, V., M., Defond, M. L., & Hung, M. (2007). Home Bias, Foreign Mutual Fund Holdings, and 
the Voluntary Adoption of International Accounting Standards. Journal of Accounting Research, 
45(1), 41-70. 
Cready, W. M. (1994). Determinants of Relative Investor Demand for Common Stocks. Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 9(3), 487-507. 
Dahlquist, M., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. M., & Williamson, R. (2003). Corporate Governance and the 
Home Bias. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 87-110. 
Dahlquist, M., & Robertsson, G. (2001). Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors, and firm 
characteristics. Journal of Financial Economics, 59(3), 413-440. 
DeFond, M., Hu, X., Hung, M., & Li, S. (2011). The Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Foreign 
Mutual Fund Ownership: The Role of Comparability. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
51(3), 240-258. 
Del Guercio, D. (1996). The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-man Laws on Institutional Equity 
Investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1), 31-62. 
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital. The 
Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325-1359. 
Donaldson, W. H. (2005). Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before the Financial Services 
Roundtable, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (April 1) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040105whd.htm (last updated May 29, 2012).  
Engel, E., Hayes, R. M., & Wang, X. (2007). The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-private 
Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44(1-2), 116-145. 
Falkenstein, E. G. (1996). Preferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund 
Portfolio Holdings. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 111-135. 
Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2008). The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors 
around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 499-533. 
Fitzpatrick, M. 1983. The Definition and Assessment of Political Risk in International Business: A 
Review of the Literature. Academy of Management Review, 8(2), 249-54. 
 
 
 
38 
Forbes, K., J. (2010). Why do foreigners invest in the United States? Journal of International 
Economics, 80(1), 3-21. 
Forbes, K., J., & Warnock, F., E. (2012). Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment. 
Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 235-251. 
Gao, F., Wu, J. S., & Zimmerman, J. (2009). Unintended Consequences of Granting Small Firms 
Exemptions from Securities Regulation: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 47(2), 459-506. 
García-Sánchez, I. M., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & Frías-Aceituno, J. V. (2013). The cultural system and 
integrated reporting. International Business Review, 22(5), 828-838. 
Gelos, R. G., & Wei, S.-J. (2005). Transparency and International Portfolio Holdings. The Journal of 
Finance, 60(6), 2987-3020. 
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. 2003. Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of 
Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective.Journal of Applied Finance, 13: 4-22. 
Gompers, P. A., & Metrick, A. (2001). Institutional Investors and Equity Prices. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 116(1), 229-259. 
Graves, S. B., & Waddock, S. A. (1990). Institutional ownership and control: implications for long-
term corporate strategy. The Executive, 4(1), 75-83. 
Gujarati, D. (2004). Basic econometrics (4th ed., International ed. ed.). Boston, [Mass.] ; London: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. (2001). Country-level investments and the effect of corruption—some 
empirical evidence. International Business Review, 10(6), 687-700. 
Hamilton, J., & Trautmann, T. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Law and Explanation. Chicago: 
CCH Incorporated. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251–1271. 
Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes 
Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(3), 
485-520. 
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital 
Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440. 
 
 
 
39 
Huberman, G. (2001). Familiarity breeds investment. Review of Financial Studies, 14(3), 659–680. 
Jackson, J. (2010). Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities. In C. R. S. C. R. f. t. U. S. Congress (Ed.). 
Jacobs, M. T. (1991). Short-term America : the causes and cures of our business myopia. Boston, 
Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 
Jain, P. K., Kim, J.-C., & Rezaee, Z. (2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity. 
Financial Review, 43(3), 361-382. 
Jain, P. K., & Rezaee, Z. (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Capital-Market Behavior: Early 
Evidence*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(3), 629-654. 
Johnston, J., & Madura, J. (2009). The Pricing of IPOs PostSarbanesOxley. Financial Review, 
44(2), 291-310. 
Johnson, R. A., Schnatterly, K., Johnson, S. G., & Chiu, S. C. (2010). Institutional investors and 
institutional environment: A comparative analysis and review. Journal of Management Studies, 
47, 1590-613. 
Kane, G. D., & Velury, U. (2004). The Role of Institutional Ownership in the Market for Auditing 
Services: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Business Research, 57(9), 976-983. 
Karmin, C., & Lucchetti, A. (2006). New York Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings. In  Wall 
Street Journal (26 January): C1. New York. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. 
The Journal of Finance, 49(5), 1541-1578. 
Leuz, C., Lins, K. V., & Warnock, F. E. (2010). Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms? 
Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 3245-3285. 
Leuz, C., Triantis, A., & Wang, Y. T. (2008). Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic 
consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45(2-3), 
181-208. 
Li, H., Pincus, M., & Rego, O. S. (2008). Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and Earnings Management. Journal of Law and Economics, 51(1), 111-134. 
Li, S., & Filer, L. (2007). The effects of the governance environment on the choice of investment 
mode and the strategic implications. Journal of World Business, 42(1), 80-98. 
 
 
 
40 
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009). The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors. Review of Financial Studies, 
22(8), 3287-3328. 
Litvak, K. (2007). The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on non-US companies cross-listed in the US. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3), 195-228. 
Merton, R. C. (1987). A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information. 
The Journal of Finance, 42(3), 483-510. 
Miller, M. H., & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of 
Finance, 40(4), 1031-1051. 
Miller, K. D. (1992). A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 23(2), 311-331. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have 
Information that Investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
O'Brien, P. C., & Bhushan, R. (1990). Analyst following and institutional ownership. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 28 (supplement), 55-76. 
Payne, T., Millar, J., & Glezen, G. (1996). Fiduciary Responsibilities and Bank-firm Relationships: An 
Analysis of Shareholder Voting by Banks. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(1), 75-87. 
Piotroski, J. D., & Srinivasan, S. (2008). Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Flow of International Listings. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(2), 383-425. 
Porter, M. E. (1992). Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System. Harvard 
Business Review, 70(5), 65-82. 
Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013). Chapter 7 - Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance1. In 
M. H. George M. Constantinides & M. S. Rene (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance 
(Vol. Volume 2, Part A, pp. 493-572): Elsevier. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55. 
Sen, P. K. (2007). Ownership Incentives and Management Fraud. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 34(7-8), 1123-1140. 
 
 
 
41 
Slangen, A. H., & van Tulder, R. J. (2009). Cultural distance, political risk, or governance quality? 
Towards a more accurate conceptualization and measurement of external uncertainty in foreign 
entry mode research. International Business Review, 18(3), 276-291. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. The American 
Economic Review, 92(3), 460-501. 
Welker, M. (1995). Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 11(2), 801-827. 
Van Nuys, K. (1993). Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Process: Evidence from the 1989 
Honeywell Proxy Solicitation. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(1), 101-132. 
Zhang, I. X. (2007). Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 44(1-2), 74-115. 
 
 
42 
 
Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics  
PANEL A: Market Level Institutional Ownership  
 
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FI 4.01% 3.95% 4.70% 4.63% 2.81% 6.26% 6.66% 7.00% 7.75% 8.42% 6.07 % 5.55% 6.10% 6.56% 
Active 1.30% 1.04% 1.20% 0.85% 0.86% 0.88% 1.10% 1.60% 1.68% 1.79% 1.85% 0.85% 0.94% 1.02% 
Passive 2.71% 2.91% 3.50% 3.78% 1.95% 5.38% 5.56% 5.40% 6.07% 6.63% 4.22% 4.70% 5.16% 5.54% 
PC 68% 74% 74% 82% 69% 86% 83% 77% 78% 79% 69% 85% 85% 84% 
 
PANEL B: Firm Level Characteristics 
 
Variable N MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 
FIO 15,887 5.352 3.441 2.843 4.893 7.089 
ACTIVEFIO 15,887 1.033 1.556 0.150 0.511 1.180 
PASSIVEFIO 15,887 4.242 2.883 2.190 3.780 5.602 
PASSCONS 15,887 0.799 0.211 0.727 0.870 0.949 
SIZE (billions) 15,887 7.514 17.769 0.732 1.808 5.571 
DY 15,887 0.014 0.020 0.000 0.006 0.021 
BM (log) 15,887 -0.841 0.726 -1.238 -0.769 -0.375 
TURN 15,887 0.206 0.169 0.099 0.160 0.258 
LEV 15,887 0.211 0.167 0.058 0.200 0.325 
ROE 15,887 0.104 0.298 0.058 0.118 0.180 
CASH 15,887 0.142 0.163 0.025 0.074 0.204 
DINDEX 15,887 1.671 0.925 1.000 2.000 2.000 
R&D 15,887 0.026 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.032 
RETURN 15,887 7.014 6.014 2.514 6.777 9.345 
ANALYST 15,887 13.422 9.074 6.000 11.000 18.000 
AUDIT 15,887 0.929 0.258 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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This table reports descriptive statistics on market-level institutional ownership, as well as the firm characteristics of our sampled firms. Panel A reports the 
fraction of shares held by foreign institutional investors (FII) investing in the U.S. between 1999 and 2012. Institutional ownership at the market level is 
defined as the sum of the institutional investor holdings at fiscal year-end, divided by the sum of total shares outstanding, for all of the firms in our sample. FI 
is the investment level of FII investing in S&P 1500 firms. Active is the level of investment in S&P 1500 firms by active FII. Passive is the investment level of 
passive FII investing in S&P 1500 firms. PC is the concentration of passive investment defined as the ratio of passive to total foreign institutional investment. 
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables used in this study. All firm-level variables are defined in the main body of the paper. Mean, 
median (P50), standard deviation (SD), 25th percentile (P25) and 75th percentile (P75) are reported. N is the number of observations.  
 
 
44 
 
Table 2  
The SOX Effect on Foreign Institutional Investment 
Variable FIO ACTIVEFIO PASSIVEFIO 
SOX 4.871*** 0.190+ 4.647*** 
 [0.000] [0.058] [0.000] 
SIZE  0.006+ 0.002 0.004 
 [0.088] [0.163] [0.281] 
DY 5.030* 2.241+ 2.963 
 [0.031] [0.052] [0.122] 
BM (log) 0.237** 0.050 0.189** 
 [0.002] [0.227] [0.004] 
TURN 1.177*** 0.107 1.081*** 
 [0.001] [0.514] [0.000] 
LEV 0.034 0.311+ -0.196 
 [0.931] [0.096] [0.579] 
ROE 0.227+ -0.031 0.266** 
 [0.060] [0.669] [0.006] 
CASH 0.978* -0.256 1.215*** 
 [0.016] [0.199] [0.001] 
DINDEX -0.098* -0.016 -0.075* 
 [0.011] [0.426] [0.033] 
RETURN 0.024*** 0.007+ 0.016*** 
 [0.000] [0.098] [0.000] 
ANALYST 0.067*** 0.011* 0.057*** 
 [0.000] [0.011] [0.000] 
AUDIT 0.194 -0.004 0.194 
 [0.210] [0.959] [0.174] 
Constant 2.443*** 1.012*** 1.393*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.362 0.111 0.378 
N 15,887 15,887 15,887 
 
This table shows the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on foreign institutional investment in U.S. listed 
firms. The numbers in brackets are p-values. ***, **, *, and + denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 3  
The SOX Effect on the Firm-Level Preferences of Foreign Investors 
Variable  FIO ACTIVEFIO PASSIVEFIO 
SIZE*SOX -0.012*** 0.000 -0.010*** 
 [0.000] [0.791] [0.000] 
DY*SOX -4.776 0.835 -5.360* 
 [0.181] [0.637] [0.050] 
BM*SOX 0.024 0.100+ -0.059 
 [0.810] [0.082] [0.480] 
TURN*SOX 2.176*** -0.216 2.417*** 
 [0.000] [0.315] [0.000] 
LEV*SOX 1.010* 0.545** 0.481 
 [0.020] [0.010] [0.172] 
ROE*SOX 0.066 -0.190 0.256+ 
 [0.731] [0.123] [0.078] 
CASH*SOX -0.174 -0.013 -0.096 
 [0.687] [0.958] [0.800] 
DINDEX*SOX -0.241*** -0.020 -0.217*** 
 [0.000] [0.560] [0.000] 
RETURN*SOX 0.030** 0.019* 0.010 
 [0.005] [0.013] [0.216] 
ANALYST*SOX 0.027*** 0.006 0.020** 
 [0.000] [0.235] [0.001] 
AUDIT*SOX 0.339 -0.138 0.518** 
 [0.135] [0.213] [0.003] 
SOX 3.896*** 0.100 3.747*** 
 [0.000] [0.630] [0.000] 
SIZE 0.017*** 0.002 0.013** 
 [0.001] [0.334] [0.002] 
DY 9.128** 1.837 7.280** 
 [0.005] [0.270] [0.005] 
BM (log) 0.192* -0.012 0.195** 
 [0.028] [0.817] [0.006] 
TURN -0.310 0.192 -0.513 
 [0.417] [0.316] [0.120] 
LEV -0.706+ -0.006 -0.627+ 
 [0.100] [0.979] [0.085] 
ROE 0.168 0.118 0.059 
 [0.192] [0.164] [0.532] 
CASH 1.094* -0.233 1.262** 
 [0.019] [0.404] [0.001] 
DINDEX 0.055 -0.002 0.062 
 [0.244] [0.942] [0.104] 
RETURN 0.003 -0.007 0.010+ 
 [0.730] [0.243] [0.055] 
ANALYST 0.040*** 0.007 0.036*** 
 [0.000] [0.187] [0.000] 
AUDIT 0.074 0.073 -0.028 
 [0.729] [0.540] [0.867] 
continued… 
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…continued    
Constant 2.916*** 1.067*** 1.817*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.368 0.113 0.386 
N 15,887 15,887 15,887 
 
This table presents the firm level preferences of foreign institutional investors (FII), post-SOX. The 
numbers in brackets are p-values. ***, **, *, and + denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 4  
Heterogeneous Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
Variable PASSCONS PASSCONS PASSCONS 
SOX 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R&D*SOX - 0.370*** - 
  [0.000]  
R&D - 0.052 - 
  [0.717]  
RD*SOX - - 0.037*** 
   [0.000] 
SIZE -0.000+ 0.000 -0.000+ 
 [0.067] [0.166] [0.069] 
DY -0.171 -0.181 -0.240 
 [0.186] [0.159] [0.119] 
BM (log) 0.011+ 0.011* 0.017** 
 [0.057] [0.047] [0.005] 
TURN -0.005 0.010 0.006 
 [0.789] [0.636] [0.809] 
LEV 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.940] [0.926] [0.938] 
ROE 0.007 0.008 0.012 
 [0.386] [0.284] [0.172] 
CASH 0.050+ 0.057* 0.038 
 [0.068] [0.040] [0.201] 
DINDEX 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.980] [0.996] [0.854] 
RETURN -0.001* -0.001+ -0.001 
 [0.045] [0.052] [0.289] 
ANALYST 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.133] [0.159] [0.126] 
AUDIT 0.007 0.010 0.008 
 [0.576] [0.413] [0.539] 
Constant 0.764*** 0.755*** 0.761*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.207 0.209 0.217 
N 15,887 15,887 15,887 
 
This table presents the SOX effect on passive institutional ownership concentration. The numbers in 
brackets are p-values. ***, **, *, and + denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 5  
Difference-in-Differences using Accelerated Filers 
Variable FIO ACTIVEFIO PASSIVEFIO 
SOX 0.666* -0.206 0.765*** 
 [0.013] [0.158] [0.000] 
ACCE*SOX 0.538* -0.471** 0.937*** 
 [0.043] [0.001] [0.000] 
ACCE 1.714*** 0.518*** 1.207*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
SIZE 0.003** 0.000 0.003** 
 [0.005] [0.448] [0.002] 
DY 9.466*** 0.450 9.173*** 
 [0.000] [0.531] [0.000] 
BM (log) -0.035 -0.079*** 0.072** 
 [0.313] [0.000] [0.010] 
TURN 1.467*** 0.701*** 0.835*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LEV 1.212*** 0.245*** 0.850*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ROE 0.251** -0.019 0.278*** 
 [0.004] [0.724] [0.000] 
CASH -0.017 -0.052 0.048 
 [0.905] [0.491] [0.684] 
RETURN 0.006 -0.001 0.003 
 [0.178] [0.809] [0.342] 
ANALYST 0.064*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AUDIT 0.717*** 0.201*** 0.497*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant -0.397** -0.021 -0.301** 
 [0.002] [0.776] [0.007] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No 
R-squared 0.310 0.115 0.331 
N 19,995 19,995 19,995 
 
This table reports a difference-in-differences regression on the investment preferences of foreign 
institutional investors (FII). The numbers in brackets are p-values. ***, **, *, and + denote 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 6  
Propensity Score Matching Estimators 
PANEL A: FIO 
Matching 
Algorithm N=19,995 
Treated 
(ACCE*SOX) 
Controls 
(Matched Firms) 
Difference 
in FIO 
p-value  
of Diff. 
Radius ATT 5.635 3.797 1.838 0.000*** 
NN(1) ATT 5.635 3.853 1.782 0.000*** 
NN(3) ATT 5.635 3.811 1.824 0.000*** 
NN(5) ATT 5.635 3.825 1.810 0.000*** 
Kernel ATT 5.635 3.791 1.844 0.000*** 
 
PANEL B: ACTIVEFIO 
Matching 
Algorithm N=19,995 
Treated 
(ACCE*SOX) 
Controls 
(Matched Firms) 
Difference 
in ACTIVEFIO 
p-value  
of Diff. 
Radius ATT 0.988 1.080 -0.092 0.001*** 
NN(1) ATT 0.988 1.118 -0.130 0.000*** 
NN(3) ATT 0.988 1.100 -0.112 0.000*** 
NN(5) ATT 0.988 1.097 -0.109 0.000*** 
Kernel ATT 0.988 1.069 -0.081 0.003** 
 
PANEL C: PASSIVEFIO 
Matching 
Algorithm N=19,995 
Treated 
(ACCE*SOX) 
Controls 
(Matched Firms) 
Difference 
in PASSIVEFIO 
p-value  
of Diff. 
Radius ATT 4.543 2.692 1.851 0.000*** 
NN(1) ATT 4.543 2.709 1.834 0.000*** 
NN(3) ATT 4.543 2.687 1.856 0.000*** 
NN(5) ATT 4.543 2.704 1.839 0.000*** 
Kernel ATT 4.543 2.698 1.845 0.000*** 
 
This table presents the SOX effect on foreign institutional investment by comparing the average 
ownership levels between firms that receive the SOX treatment (ACCE*SOX) and control firms 
identified using various marching algorithms. Panels A, B and C present the differences for FIO, 
ACTIVEFIO and PASSIVEFIO, respectively. ATT denotes that the reported differences are the average 
treatment effects on the treated. N is the number of observations used in the propensity score 
calculations. *** and ** denote significance at the 0.1% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Falsification Tests – Monte Carlo Permutation 
 
 True Coef. Random Shuffle Coef.>True Coef. No. of Trials 
Implied 
p-value 
FIO     
ACCE*SOX 0.538 0 10,000 0.000 
     
ACTIVEFIO     
ACCE*SOX -0.471 0 10,000 0.000 
     
PASSIVEFIO     
ACCE*SOX 0.937 0 10,000 0.000 
 
This table reports the results of Monte Carlo permutation tests where the treatment variable 
(ACCE*SOX) is randomly shuffled 10,000 times. The tests are performed separately for 
FIO, ACTIVEFIO and PASSIVEFIO. True Coef. denotes the ACCE*SOX coefficients 
estimated by running the models presented in table 5. The next column reports the number 
of times the coefficient of the randomly shuffled (placebo) treatment variable is larger than 
the true coefficient.  
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Endnotes 
                                                
i At its peak (in 2008), the FII equity holding in the average U.S. firm in our sample is 8.4%. This translates to an 
investment of $580 million, given that the average market capitalization is $6.9 billion. The FII investment in the 
average U.S. firm is twice this firm’s investment in research and development and more than twice its capital 
expenditures (not reported). Therefore, FII investment in U.S. firms is not trivial. 
ii SOX is a United States federal law that set enhanced standards to improve the accuracy and reliability of 
disclosure across the board for all U.S. listed firms. It was enacted as an attempt to restore trust in the U.S. 
capital markets after several high-profile corporate scandals (Li, et al., 2008). 
iii The recent report by the Congressional Research Service charts the rise of foreign ownership of U.S. financial 
assets over the last decade and discusses the benefits and costs of such changes in ownership of U.S. assets. 
Throughout the report, trust in the U.S. capital markets is highlighted as one of the main reasons behind the 
increase in foreign investment. 
iv Merton’s (1987) model predicts that rational investors have a strong preference for firms they are better 
informed about. Huberman (2001) theoretically developed this argument in the context of behavioral biases and 
coined the phrase “familiarity breeds investment”. Chan, et al. (2005) identify familiarity as one of six 
determinants of domestic/foreign bias. In their theoretical model, these six determinants affect the deadweight 
costs of investing in a particular country, hence the extent of the bias. 
v The idea of a SOX-led improvement in the U.S. information environment is also supported by indirect evidence. 
Johnston and Madura (2009) report better Initial Public Offering (IPO) performance, that is, lower underpricing 
and higher post-IPO performance, for U.S. firms, which they attribute to the enhanced transparency brought 
about by SOX provisions.  
vi Under the constraint of the ‘prudent man’ rule, institutional investors have incentives to protect themselves 
from liability by tilting their portfolios toward those assets that are easy to defend in court. 
vii The data for this classification are available from http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/ 
viii  Two databases, Thomson-Reuters 13F and Thomson One Banker, provide comprehensive, firm-level 
institutional investor ownership details for U.S. listed firms. We follow the extensive literature on institutional 
investment and use the 13F database as our data source. Thomson-Reuters 13F collects all the information 
contained in Form 13F filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. law requires all 
institutional investors with $100m or more in assets under management to file a 13F form with the SEC. 
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ix We exclude American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and foreign stocks from our sample. 
x Even though our dependent variable is censored at 0 and 100%, we decide against reporting the results of the 
censored regressions given there is no significant clustering of observations at either cut-off point. Our results 
remain qualitatively the same when we run censored regressions. 
xi The definition of FIO does not allow for the use of investor fixed effects. Still, some of the unobserved 
investor characteristics that relate to their investment preferences will be captured by the firm fixed effects. In 
unreported results, we include in all our analyses country dummies. These capture unobserved heterogeneity in 
the foreign investor country of domicile, for example, geographic distance from the U.S., cultural and language 
differences, differences in legal background, and so on. The results remain unchanged. 
xii Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), in order to calculate market-level institutional ownership variables 
we aggregate all institutional investor shareholdings (per category) and divide them by the sum of the shares 
outstanding for all of the firms in our sample. To avoid confusion, we use different variable names for the market 
level ownership variables (presented only in Table 1, Panel A), compared to the related firm level ones (used in 
the rest of the paper).  
xiii We have also run several specifications (not reported here) using the component dummies of the DINDEX 
measure separately in order to examine the isolated effect of each dimension on foreign ownership. We conclude 
that most of these dimensions are important determinants of foreign ownership; however there is some 
heterogeneity depending on the type of foreign ownership examined (active vs. passive investors). 
xiv In our regression analyses we use firm fixed effect panel regressions. Hence, our emphasis is on ‘within firm 
time-series variation’ of our covariates. Given our modelling approach, the R&D expenditure for each firm in 
our sample is the first difference from the time-series average R&D expenditure for this firm. Thus, we control 
for cross-sectional differences in the level of R&D expenditure, which is important given the expected 
differences between firms that belong to different industries.  
xv The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) extended the compliance dates for non-accelerated 
filers on several occasions, so that they could improve the quality of their efforts. In 2010, a provision in the 
Dodd-Frank Act (Section 989G) made the exemption for non-accelerated filers permanent.  
xvi Throughout our previous analyses, we control for the level of corporate governance quality (DINDEX). This 
restricts our sample to 15,887 observations due to missing values in DINDEX; most of the data unavailability is 
for smaller firms. This leaves us with very few non-accelerated filers in our sample. Given the importance of this 
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sub-group of firms for the analysis of this section, we exclude DINDEX in order to capture more non-accelerated 
filers. None of our previous analyses are sensitive to the decision to include DINDEX. 
xvii In unreported analysis, we find that the negative ACCE*SOX coefficient for active FII is driven by their 
investment behaviour during the post financial crisis period. For the 1999-2008 period, the ACCE*SOX 
coefficient in column 2 is insignificant, whereas the SOX coefficient is negative significant. This indicates that in 
our setting (a) the expected retrenchment of capital during global crises (Forbes & Warnock, 2012) primarily 
affects active not passive FII and (b) the financial crisis affected the type of firms (accelerated vs. non-
accelerated) active FII withdraw capital from. We have re-run all the analyses presented in this paper for the pre-
crisis period alone, i.e., 1999-2006, and our main findings remain unchanged. 
